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Governing Greater China:  
Dynamic Perspectives and Transforming Interactions 
 
Gordon C. K. Cheung

 
 
Abstract:  
 
The composition of Greater China among the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan entails 
an emerging form of micro governance where an ecological evolution of sub-group 
interaction and cross-over of economic and social activities has been generating a 
dynamic of change within the East Asian region. The constitution of Greater China 
by the social, economic, political, business and even daily commuting creates some 
soul searching questions about the possible outcomes of their intense interaction. To 
what extent has integration been made within the Greater China through these 
interactions? Is China the economic linchpin or does China need to co-operate in one 
way or another to facilitate the modes of economic development? What are the 
attitudes and strategies used by Hong Kong or Taiwan when confronted with such 
economic cum social entity? More importantly, where, and, under what conditions, 
the interactions among the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong will lead to? In this paper, I 
am going to use a conceptual model which includes four interactions: integration, 
interdependence, identity and independence (Four Is) to capture the catalyst of change 
that collectively entails these inter-mingled economic, social and cultural elements. 
People who live in the vast context of this geographical region experience the change. 
Through daily interaction, they help write the context of change through business 
activities, investment, migration, trade, culture, academic exchange, political and 
social development along the Four Is. 
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Introduction 
The politics of the economic relations among the People‟s Republic of China 
(PRC), Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau engenders a cluster of complex interactions 
named Greater China. The economic development within Greater China is intense. 
Besides trade and investment, in terms of consumption, according to the spokesman 
of VISA, the credit-card company, credit card use in the Greater China region (Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and the PRC) has recorded US$10 billion in 2004, an increase of 30 
percent from last year. Within these areas, the PRC‟s credit card spending was the 
fastest of having an increase of 270 percent, which was equivalent to US$0.6 billion 
in 2004
1
. In 2007, according to Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Chinese 
(China mainland) credit card spending will rise to US$18.3 to US$19.6 billion.
2
 In 
Hong Kong, a list of economic boosting efforts, including the Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), Sojourn travellers and Pan Pearl River Delta 
Regional Co-operation, were bestowed from the PRC to Hong Kong in order to 
rejuvenate its economy after the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARs) 
outbreak in 2003. In Macau, the re-election of Edmund Ho as the second Chief 
Executive in August 2004 reiterated his skilful economic strategies in concentrating 
on both casino and entertainment industry. These recent economic and political 
developments pave the way for a concern of the future governance and interactions of 
Greater China. With one thing in common, their future economic and political 
development will be affected and challenged by the PRC, where market economy has 
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been adopted as the linchpin of economic growth.
3
 The competition and cooperation 
between China and Hong Kong becomes increasingly more obvious. Business people 
and government officials came up with various measures and options to facilitate 
further integration.
4
 
  
To start with, the concept of Greater China is yet to be fully developed.
5
 In a narrow 
geographic context, it refers to the economic and cultural interactions among China, 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Its political connotation, however, can be 
understood as a way in which the Chinese government attempts to lure Taiwan to re-
unite with the PRC. Culturally speaking, Greater China can be more broadly defined 
to include many economic, cultural and social activities among Southeast Asian 
countries, especially in the constitution of network-building and social capital 
formation.
6
 Amongst the English literature, David Shambaugh‟s edited volume 
Greater China defined the parameter of how to study the concept from economic, 
political and cultural approaches.
7
 Barry Naughton addressed the Greater China 
issues from another angle by looking at the nexus that constructs the existing 
economic interaction and business collaboration of this ever evolving area.
8
 Among 
the Chinese scholars, Zhilian Huang and M. K. Nyaw approached the concept with 
particular reference to their robust business activities, cultural variety, social network 
and people and money migration.
9
  
The composition of Greater China entails an emerging form of micro 
governance where an increasing evolution of sub-group interaction and cross-over of 
economic and social activities has been generating a dynamic of change within the 
East Asian region. Areas such as the Pearl River Delta (PRD), Bohai/Yellow Sea 
(BYS) and the Tumen River Delta (TRD) are just some of the examples.
10
 More 
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importantly, they are beginning to bridge their economic and business relations with 
areas other than their regional context.
11
 More recently, a Pan Pearl River Delta 
Region (PPRDR) has been advocated by Huang Huahua, the Governor of Guangdong. 
This initiative decides to incorporate the integration concept to include nine provinces 
in China – Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Guangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, Hunan 
and Hainan, plus Hong Kong and Macau. There are 450 million people in this region, 
comprising US$5 trillion Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
12
 However, there is an 
enormous competition among these sub-groups. Apart from constituting the internal 
competition within Greater China, they also affect the traditional outlook of regional 
economic competition in East Asia. One of the salient examples comes from the 
competition between Hong Kong and Shanghai. Before the changeover in 1997, 
Hong Kong was a British colony. The competition came from the regional economic 
development with the other three tigers-Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. After 
1997, Hong Kong became part of China, and the echo of competition among other 
urban cities in China siphoned into daily media and newspapers. In 2002, a report on 
the competitiveness between Hong Kong and Shanghai indicated that Hong Kong 
outperformed Shanghai in a list of indicators of competitiveness.
13
 By 2003, however, 
Hong Kong was criticised as needing to re-define its new positioning and economic 
status in the Pearl River Delta in order to keep maintain the competitiveness.
14
 While 
competition within Greater is intense, there are several scenarios that may constitute 
the future micro governance. 
 
Transnationalism, Network and Crossover in Greater China  
Greater China is highly relevant to East Asian regional governance because its 
concept, composition and competition indicate a micro governance, where intense 
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border-crossing, time and spatial relevance and strong cultural bondage are 
intermingled in our globalized East Asian affairs. As Harry Harding correctly pointed 
out that the concept of Greater China is by no means clear. However, „… but its very 
vagueness is one of its greatest virtues.‟15 Nevertheless, I shall concentrate on the 
micro governance among the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong to illustrate the modes of 
development that are being constructed by their daily political, economic, trade, 
human and knowledge interactions.
16
 Kenichi Ohmae provides an innovative model 
to study the economic activities of the nation-states, where more and more 
interactions are being captured by the four Is: investment, industry, information and 
individual.
17
 „The end of nation-states‟ mirrors the activities developed through 
economic, social and political interactions in Greater China. He developed his ideas 
further in trying to locate the „invisible continent‟ in the globalized business and 
economic nexus.
18
 In such circumstance, the governance of the invisible continent has 
to be more eclectic to include the efforts of individual states as well as global 
society.
19
 The importance of economic activities as the major linchpin connecting 
nation-states has been elaborated by Richard Rosecrance. He initiated a concept of 
„virtual state‟ where trade, human capital and flows of knowledge will construct a 
genuine nexus of activities.
20
   
To understand Greater China, the social economic relations and the cultural 
and social bonds among Hong Kong, Taiwan and China should be studied not just 
from their geographical angle. Emphasis should be made through the economic and 
political forces that transcend the so-called geographic boundary among these three 
areas, particularly in the experience and daily social and economic contacts among all 
the people who truly constitute the Greater China economic and social nexus. In other 
words, as described by Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, „… borders tend to 
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be characterised by identities which are shifting and multiple, in ways which are 
framed by the specific state configurations which encompass them and within which 
people must attribute meaning to their experience of border life.‟21 In understanding 
border-crossing and global immigrations, Saskia Sassen pointed out that international 
migration driven by poverty was less convincing. An understanding of global 
migration, perhaps, should be studied from the ways in which global production and 
market demand are most intense and robust.
22
 Given that China is a gigantic hub of 
manufacturing and production, it naturally attracts immigrants of whom are those 
people moving across the boundaries among Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC. A 
„significant realignment in the social and economic structure‟ is being constituted 
within Greater China.
23
  
In considering the time and spatial connection of Greater China, Sum Ngai-
Ling argued that various symbolic and human interactions, such as guanxi, of Greater 
China „… consolidate a reliable and effective social space of relatives, friends and 
business partners to be called upon for utilitarian purpose.‟24 Such human interaction, 
facilitated mostly in Chinese business circles either inside China or within the Greater 
China, may give rise to some „ways-of-doing-things‟ that can enhance business, 
economic and even political activities. Other studies also demonstrate the facilitation 
of networking among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Henry Yeung 
contended that „In Chinese business, relationships are seen as a means to an end: 
Chinese businessmen find it advantageous to rely on particularistic ties in their local 
and overseas business activities because of the restrictive institutional context of 
Southeast Asia.‟25 In studying social networks that are generated by the economic, 
social and business activities among the Greater China, we should „… regard 
developmental networks as socially constructed by actors who are conscious of their 
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participation in networks and who understand these relationships as networks.‟26 In 
other words, given the incentive that social networks can lubricate economic and 
social activities, there should be ways in which these networking activities can be 
further invested in the Chinese circle because „… a network can often be greater than 
its constituent part.‟27 Danny Unger, in order to demonstrate that „Social capital is the 
fossil record of successful past efforts to institutionalize ongoing cooperation,‟ 
applies such concepts to explain how and in what ways that social networks can be 
built among the overseas Chinese in Thailand as a socially constructed 
phenomenon.
28
 Of course, in the case of overseas Chinese or Greater China, one of 
the greatest criticisms of social capital is that those who do not have social capital 
(who do not belong to these Chinese communities) may be excluded from getting the 
benefits from which social capital generated.
29
 To map out the future development of 
Greater China, one of the most salient areas of interest is the economic geography 
that constituted by the growing inter-relations of Greater China.
30
 Some indicators 
such as „… economic proximity, the degree of openness to trade, the relative intensity 
of trade, the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), the amount of capital from Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Macro invested in industrial production and lastly, the density of 
air traffic‟ may help to measure the degree of their interaction.  
These and many other theories on transnationalism help illustrate the change 
in Greater China with a certain degree of precision. They also demonstrate a way of 
understanding how Greater China evolves with those ingredients of change, economic 
opportunities, migration, social interactions and cultural exchanges, etc. Nevertheless, 
those theoretical perspectives along the line of transnationalism or globalization paint 
a picture that cannot capture the entire meaning behind the function and the 
manifestation of Greater China. The solidarity coming from the Greater China is 
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different in a sense that those actors (Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC) are highly 
homogeneous in terms of historical, cultural, racial and social background. As 
Huntington recently warned the alarming influence of the highly homogeneous 
Hispanic migrants into the United States,
31
 by the same token, the economic, social 
and political interaction of the Greater China within that highly homogeneous 
economies will certainly create some questions that require some in-depth analysis. 
Therefore, if we put the Greater China into a social microscope, we may discern some 
ways and means of governance. It is in this direction that I am going to throw light to 
some perspectives on the possible directions of interaction in Greater China.  
 
Micro Governance of Greater China in Operation 
 As I have mentioned earlier, the constitution of Greater China by the social, 
economic, political, business and even daily commuting creates some soul searching 
questions about the possible outcomes of their intense interaction.
32
 To what extent 
has integration been made within the Greater China through these interactions? Is 
China the economic linchpin or does China need to co-operate in one way or another 
to facilitate the modes of economic development? What are the attitudes and 
strategies used by Hong Kong or Taiwan when confronted with such an economic 
cum social behemoth?  
 These questions are not easy to tackle. Yet, if we try to work out a conceptual 
linkage among these questions, we must ask where, and, under what conditions, the 
interactions among the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong will lead to? According to Alex 
Callinicos, those individuals (an agency) will be interacting with the structure (the 
society) in order to make history.
33
 To what extent does the agency affect the 
structure depend on pace of interaction, level of interdependence and the synthesis of 
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their actions.
34
 By the same token, people in the Greater China are interacting among 
themselves through different channels-trade, migration, investment, work, tourist, etc. 
As William Callahan maintained, the relations of the Greater China „… are not 
merely state-to-state diplomacy or patterns of international trade and investment, but 
involve less formal people-to-people relations, flows and disjunctures in a 
transnational political economy.‟35 In addition, the Greater China that we are focusing 
is highly conditioned by Confucian culture that „… is crucial for an understanding of 
the political economy and the moral fabric of industrial East Asia.‟36 
The previous section indicates that transnational theory initially works quite 
well in the case of Greater China in explaining their interactions. Yet, Hong Kong, 
although is still governed by „One country, two systems,‟ has been moving toward the 
PRC not only economically. Many recent evidences indicate that Hong Kong is being 
assimilated into the contexts of China. Chief Executive Donald Tsang more recently 
promoted a new identity of „New Hong Kong people,‟ which generally refers to the 
combination between liberalism and Chinese nationalism.
37
 The Economist once used 
„slow boiling‟ to describe this process. I shall argue that they are instead inadvertently 
to be moved along the way in which there is no alternative. Taiwan is once called a 
„renegade province‟ by the PRC. It becomes a mission and imperative for the PRC to 
re-capture Taiwan. In other words, transnationalism theory is not enough to explain 
the conundrum of Greater China. The economic integration, business investment and 
the people‟s moving in and out across the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan partly 
constitute the consensus of „Chineseness‟. Collectively, these inter-mingled economic, 
social and cultural elements help develop an emerging catalyst of change, which 
needs some more analytical tools to further investigate. 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Perspectives of Greater China’s Interactions: The Four Is 
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Figure 1 indicates four possible perspectives that may be used as the 
conceptual tools to probe their interactions. The horizontal X axis represents the trend 
of their historical development. The vertical Y axis indicates the modes of 
interactions among the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Line H represents the 
economic influence of the PRC in Greater China. Line G represents the economic 
influence of Hong Kong and Taiwan in Greater China. What I am trying to illustrate 
is not individual economic development, which can go up and down. My argument is 
that Taiwan and Hong Kong become less and less visible by moving into the swirl of 
Greater China economic development, where the PRC is the biggest player.
38
 
According to the survey that conducted by the Commonwealth Magazine in Taiwan, 
there has been an indication of marginalization of Taiwan in four aspects: trade 
dependency on the PRC, decreasing of foreign direct investment (FDI), decreasing 
the number of travellers and less Taiwanese students going abroad to study.
39
 1997 is 
a reliable year of distinction because Hong Kong was returned to the PRC. In addition, 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis proved to be extremely important to the consolidation 
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of the PRC‟s economic power in East Asia later on and the forth-coming debates on 
China‟s „peaceful rise‟ and „soft power‟.40 
Such combination of interactions gives rise to four possible zones of 
interaction. I therefore tentatively call them four Is: Integration, Interdependence, 
Identity and Independence.
41
 The four Is attempt only to probe the opportunities and 
challenges that lie ahead confronting with Greater China. Zone A is zone of 
Integration, under which both Hong Kong and Taiwan merges with the PRC in terms 
of economic development. The process is ever changing and to be more 
comprehensive by the day-to-day interaction. Zone B is zone of Interdependence, 
where economic interaction is one of the most important parts of the modes of 
interaction. Nevertheless, the PRC cannot go it alone to perpetuate its economic 
development. Other factors such as the United States, globalization process and 
international organization also provide impetus to co-operate and co-ordinate with 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. There are chemicals to be made underlying the globalization. 
In other words, the world helps facilitate the interaction of Greater China by not being 
pedestrian but actively in posing some principles in seeing the Greater China to 
follow the track. In addition, Zone C is the zone of Identity. It demonstrates that the 
social interactions among the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan act more independently 
according to the general public‟s social and economic experiences. People living in 
this social and economic milieu perceive more than they can digest in terms of 
economic opportunities and political disposition. They turn to something different. 
Arguably, it is very hard to read the mind of the people. Zone D is the zone of 
independence. This zone illustrates that the interaction, especially in the case between 
the PRC and Taiwan, has been held back by the independent movements in Taiwan 
during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
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from 2000 to 2008. These four perspectives do not intend to cover all aspects of 
interactions of the Greater China. Yet, they help us conceptualise the ever-changing 
political economy of Greater China.  
 
 
 
Integration 
 Under Zone A, Taiwan and Hong Kong will merge with the PRC in terms of 
their increasing economic interactions, FDI and knowledge transfers, etc. economic 
growth. This development has been materialised through various mechanisms and 
processes. For instance, Hong Kong recorded 12.1 percent real growth of GDP in the 
second quarter of 2004.
42
  Yet, the recovery of Hong Kong‟s economy was created 
out of the „visible hand‟ from the PRC. After the SARs outbreak, The PRC began to 
launch various measures to boost the economy of Hong Kong by first signing the 
CEPA with Hong Kong government, under which many Hong Kong made products 
would be excluded from tariff. CEPA became more extensive in the middle of 2004, 
and more Chinese investors would like to have reciprocal benefits to be able to invest 
in Hong Kong. In fact, after the signing of CEPA, it galvanised the search for 
business opportunities with Hong Kong among some cities in China. Some 
neighbouring cities such as Foshan, Jiangmen, Dongguan, Shunde, Zhongshan, 
Zhuhai began to search for ways and means of economic integration.
43
 Later, in order 
to further enhance Hong Kong‟s economy, the PRC allowed more Sojourn travellers 
to come to Hong Kong to consume. Other more creative ideas such as Pan Pearl 
River Delta Regional Co-operation was put forward onto Hong Kong to materialise 
economic integration.
44
 To facilitate a better way for the daily activities for the people 
crossing Hong Kong‟s border to China, the Hong Kong Immigration department 
began to issue a new identity card. It can be used to clear the customs by just 
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inserting the card together with putting your finger on the screening machine. This 
mechanism is a result of the government's policy toward integration between the 
people in Hong Kong and their cross-border social and economic activities.  
 In terms of cross Strait economic integration, according to Karen Sutter, 
„Further cross-Strait economic integration and specialization seem inevitable given 
the highly complementary nature of the economies of the PRC and Taiwan.‟45 For 
economic benefit alone, further economic integration between China and Taiwan is 
buttressed by the possibility of profit making, especially in terms of foreign direct 
investment. Charng Kao, Director of Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, 
demonstrated that profit from investing in China could be obtained, especially for 
those first movers.
46
 The 1990s also witnessed many Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
investing in the PRC, making the division of production between Taiwan and the 
PRC an inevitable outcome of future development.
47
 More interestingly, there is a 
newly developed trend which is to build primary and secondary schools to cater for 
the Taiwanese businessmen who‟s been in the PRC for a long period. For one thing, 
those Taiwanese businessmen do not want their kids to be educated in the local 
schools in the PRC for fear of the political indoctrination. Secondly, it would be a 
more economical way than that to send their kids to the international schools in 
China.
48
 
According to the Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs in 
Taiwan, Taiwan had already invested US$37.7 billion in the PRC from 1991 to June 
2004.
49
 In terms of remittance, in the first six months of 2004, Taiwan had made 
US$870.45 million individual remittances to the PRC, up 57 percent from last year.
50
  
In the same period, International phone call from Taiwan to the PRC increased 34.9 
percent with 137,073,340 calls all together.
51
 Those telephone calls, whether due to 
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the reasons of business activities or family affairs, genuinely construct a social and 
human network that facilitate transnationalism in today‟s globalised world society. As 
Steven Vertovec pointed out that „One of the most significant (yet under-researched) 
modes of transnational practice affecting migrants‟ lives is the enhanced ability to 
telephone family members.‟52 Those calls and telecommunication help paint another 
picture behind the integration process that generated by the day-to-day economic and 
social activities between Taiwan and the PRC. In the study of Chinese 
transnationalism, Donald Nonini and Aihwa Ong regarded „Chinese transnationalism 
as a culturally distinctive domain within the strategies of accumulation of the new 
capitalism-both Chinese and non-Chinese-emerging over the last two decades in the 
Asia-Pacific region.‟ 53  Other obvious integration process included the building a 
bridge from Hong Kong to Macau and Zhuhai. According to Michel Enright and 
Edith Scott, the economic benefit should be the heart of the discussion of such 
massive infrastructure when economic integration is concerned.
54
 The integration 
between Taiwan and the PRC is moving to another level beyond economic and 
business investment but to more cultural and social factor such as education. In order 
to cater for the education of the children of those Taiwanese businessmen, there are 
lots of schools that established especially for these students.
55
 Given the fact that the 
pace of integration has been developed in different aspects in the Greater China, yet, 
we cannot rule out the regional influence or the interdependence that entails their 
interaction. 
 
Interdependence 
 Zone B represents the zone of interdependence. Here in this area of interaction, 
the economic relations among Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC not only work in a 
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centripetal manner that is moving toward the PRC, but also become more 
interdependent in a way that engenders mutual recognition and co-ordination. To 
begin with, the so-called economic security has been gradually developed to come 
into being a force of connection among the Greater China. Unlike the Cold War, 
when East Asian international relations were under the ideological contention 
between the United States and China, the post-Cold War international relations, very 
frequently, precipitated the ideas of economic development and the importance of 
market mechanism in resolving economic conflicts.
56
  
To mention, the Asian financial crisis became a salient, if not classical, case 
that shattered many people‟s dreams of Asian miracle. Yet, in the case of China, 
according to Lowell Dittmer, „One significant strategic implication of the crisis has 
been to enhance the relative importance of China.‟57 That China did not devaluate its 
currency was praised by many Southeast Asian countries because they had already 
suffered a lot due to the financial crisis and the „rescue‟ from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Greater China, on the contrary, was the region that affected 
the least among the other countries. Taiwan did devalue her currency in October 1997. 
Yet, she still recorded almost US$6 billion trade surplus in 1998!
58
 Hong Kong‟s 
economy was affected after the Asian financial crisis. Nevertheless, there was no 
single bank closed down immediately after the crisis.  
To China, the implication of the Asian financial crisis is that first, China 
becomes economically more important in relation to other East and Southeast Asian 
countries. Chinese currency was not, and still is not, an international currency, 
although economists are having different views on the liberalization and revaluation 
of the Chinese renminbi (Chinese currency).
59
 To facilitate economic growth, China 
needs Hong Kong to provide a window for receiving international financial 
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knowledge. As can be seem from the consolidation of Hong Kong‟s financial strength 
from the Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong also serves as a place for initial public 
offering (IPO) for many Chinese enterprises.
60
 For instance, Air China and ZTE (a 
Chinese maker of telecommunications equipment) wanted to raise US$750 million to 
US$1 billion and US$350 million to US$400 million, respectively in the late 2004 in 
Hong Kong.
61
 Taiwan has other options to maintain the interdependence with the 
PRC. One argument maintains that Taiwan may use its economic power, through 
trade and investment, to leverage a certain weight between economic and political 
power in terms of cross strait relations. In other words, as Greg Mastel contended, „…, 
many Taiwan leaders perceive growing economic ties with China as a disincentive to 
military action against Taiwan by Beijing. This viewpoint ensures a generally 
sympathetic ear in many quarters for the lobbying effort of the Taiwanese business 
community.‟ 62  The underlying assumption of this argument is that the relations 
between China and Taiwan is a repetitive game. As long as the interactions (trade, 
investment, immigration and communication) continuous, the long term relations 
should be leading to a more co-operative manner.
63
   
In addition, the joining with international organisation, World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) provides 
another platform for Taiwan to play Beijing‟s political influence against the 
international economic and political recognition. According to Gerald Chan, 
„However, for a country in a situation in which state-to-state relationships are difficult 
to establish, like the case of Taiwan, participation in international organisations 
assumes a greater significance as a means to strengthen a country‟s international 
legitimacy.‟64 For instance, the PRC began its re-application for WTO membership in 
1986. Eventually, both the PRC and Taiwan became WTO members in December 
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2001. In terms of cross strait relations, WTO serves as a linchpin for both countries to 
use economic and legal means to solve issues relating to economic affairs. More 
importantly, WTO, as one of the most important economic organisations in the world, 
allows certain disciplinary effects to take place between Taiwan and the PRC, 
providing a valuable international forum to Taiwan to resort to international 
recognition, if not sympathy.
65
  
 
Identity 
 C refers to the zone of identity. The questioning of Greater China 
being indifferent from China‟s influence, in the first instance, seems impossible. It 
mirrors a similar tone that contended by Gerald Segal‟s 1999 article named „Does 
China Matter?‟ in Foreign Affairs.66 Needless to say, economic incentive, political 
and business relations all conjured up an ethos of relations, if not tied bondage, 
among Hong Kong, Taiwan and the PRC. However, in the case of Hong Kong, after 
the collapse of the housing market, the risk of unemployment, the economic 
downturn, the SARs outbreak, the half million demonstration on the street on 1 July 
2003 and the inability of electing their own chief executive; according to Yeung Au, 
Hong Kong people began to realise that they should rely on their own. More and 
more people become self-employed as a result.
67
 They enjoy this risky but flexible 
working style, especially for those with entrepreneurship. Yet, this trend is also likely 
to generate a sense of disassociation from the society, resulting in gradual decline of 
social capital.
68
 Similarly, this „liminal citizenship,‟69--being Chinese in nature and 
nurtured in the former British colony, creates an identity crisis, given the flux of 
political and economic maze.
70
  In anthropology, liminality studies, according to 
Victor Turner, refer to entities that are “neither here nor there; they are betwixt and 
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between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and 
ceremonial.”71 The July 2007 demonstration for the protection of Queen‟s Pier from 
being demolished was considered to be a reveal of the „collective memory‟ among the 
people of Hong Kong toward the consolidation of Hong Kong‟s unique identity (a 
former British colony turned Special Administrative Region (SAR) under Chinese 
sovereignty).
72
  
In other words, the identity of Hong Kong people has been under-going a 
transformation from the question of „does it matter?‟ to „all it [identity] matters‟. On 
political identities, the dichotomy of the landslide victory of the pro-Beijing 
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) over the 
pro-democracy group in the District Election in November 2007 and the landslide 
victory of the pro-democracy candidate Anson Chan over the pro-Beijing candidate 
Regina Ip in the by-election of the Legislative Council in the early December 2007 
sent a clear distinction between social and political identity. In terms of social identity, 
DAB does the job of catering harmony and services on district level,
73
 and yet, the 
landslide victory of Anson Chan demonstrated that people still identify an open and 
liberal political environment, if an open election is given.   
 Taiwan‟s experience is not sanguine either. The economy of Taiwan 
dichotomises between two groups: the haves and have-nots. The haves are those 
people who have been investing heavily economically as well as politically in China. 
They tend to be more positive toward the economic relations between China and 
Taiwan. The have-nots are those people who do not or could not invest in China, 
resulting in placing all their political stakes in Taiwan. They feel that their economic 
opportunity and international space have been restrained.
74
 Besides, if we believe that 
the mass media does provide a certain level of accuracy in reflecting the social 
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situation in Taiwan, the mass media actually paints a very different picture about the 
general attitude toward the so-called China‟s influence. One intriguing example is 
about the news reports on TV. On the same screen, there is an anchor presenting with 
subtitles running at the bottoms, on the top and sometimes on the right telling the 
audiences other pieces of news happening elsewhere. If this is not information 
explosion, this kind of multi-dimensional news reporting will certainly paralyse your 
sense, if not your mind. In addition, amount the hundred strong television channels in 
Taiwan, the coverage and the degree of diversification are literally to instigate people 
from listening to or understanding of local social, economic and political relations 
and across the strait. Some cluster of channels cover stock market predictions by 
some financial experts, another cluster of channels covering those solo female 
dancers dressing in bikini, some other cluster of channels covering Buddhism 
preaching, amongst many other news channels, etc. If those channels reflect some of 
the preferences of the audiences, one possible explanation would be that there are 
many audiences who want to search for alternatives. Buddhism, for instance, is an 
alternative for those who want to disassociate from the reality, which is supposed to 
be flooded with sins and different kinds of wrongdoings. By listening to the 
Buddhism preaching, one's mind and soul can be relieved, sometimes redeemed if 
following closely those preaching. Although some channels seem to be tacky and 
even indecent, the government has no alternative but just to put up with this kind of 
media with an ostrich policy. Of course, from the TV station‟s points of view, the 
production of such programmes may probably be the own source of income because 
there are viewers; and therefore there are advertisement.
75
 Yet, it also can be 
interpreted as a way in which neither does the government want to offend the people 
(the voters) nor does it want to offend the media (the umpire).
76
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To understand, many people become disinterested in either the jumping onto 
the bandwagon of the rise of China or to stick with the idea of independence. They 
are being indifferent of the political and social situation. The mass media here 
provides some „neurotherapy‟ to the public with „dancing dopamine‟, if not 
„information Prozac‟ to cure the general public‟s depressive feeling towards the 
economy or the politics. In the international environment, the rise of China gives rise 
to many talking points for people in general and some speculations and analysis 
among policy makers and academic workers.
77
 Yet, among those Chinese (Hong 
Kong and Taiwan) who experience and live with the day-to-day bombardment of the 
„clear and present influence‟ of the PRC, there comes those middle-ground ways for 
them to choose away from the political and economic extremes. Yet, this 
categorisation may not be exclusive in trying to capture the whole development of the 
general public towards public affairs. They point to some illustrations which may be 
useful in trying to examine the social response in Taiwan toward the rise of China.   
 
Independence 
 The final zone D refers more towards the political situation, if not 
impasses, between Taiwan and the PRC. The re-election of Chen Shui-bian, the 
incumbent president, as the new president of Taiwan in March 2004 re-inserted some 
unknown political as well as economic factors between Taiwan and the PRC. In his 
second term inaugural speech on 20 May 2004, Chen emphasized the need to revise 
the constitution and the reconciliation of the ethnic differences. Although he did 
mention that he would establish a committee for cross strait peaceful development, he 
did not mention re-unification.
78
 That sort of political message has been translated as, 
according to the PRC, politically intransigent and ideologically unforgivable. No 
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wonder on the eve of his inaugural speech, a group of Chinese Taiwan relations 
specialists openly advocated Chinese nationalism through the three-abundance policy: 
abundant 2008 Olympic game, abundant economic development and abundant Sino-
American relations in order to pose some pressure, if not an ultimatum to the new 
leader of Taiwan.
79
  
For one thing, Chen‟s political ideology is to treat Taiwan as a sovereign state, 
making the PRC very annoyed. In an interview during his first term of administration, 
he defined Taiwan as a „sovereign state …. Neither the ROC nor the PRC is 
subordinate to the other. I want to make it clear that Taiwan is not a part of, a local 
government of, or a province of any country. This is a fact of history. We want to 
emphasize to the international community that, as a sovereign state, the ROC cannot 
be downgraded, treated as a local government, or marginalized by anyone.‟80 Chen‟s 
winning of the first election was considered as „Condorcet loser,‟ meaning that his 
winning „… was partly due to the difficulties faced by the supporters of the other two 
candidates for strategic coordination in such a close race.‟81 In such circumstance 
where political legitimacy is based not on consolidated ethos but rather on the 
swinging and haphazard political demand, it is very tempting for Chen to resort to 
strong political message, especially on cross strait relations, to retain his popularity.  
The cross strait relations dropped to the nadir when the PRC fired four 
Chinese M-9 ballistic missiles between 8-13 March 1996 to the North coast of 
Taiwan. According to Barton Gellman, „The exercise designated by the Chinese 
military as “Strait 961” was by many measures the most provocative ever staged in 
the Taiwan Strait,…‟82 The so-called „missile crisis‟ was the second missile exercise 
resulted from Lee Teng-hui (Taiwan‟s first elected President) visiting to his Alma 
Mater at Cornell University in June 1995. The military exercise was a warning signal 
 22 
to the Taiwanese before the general election. On winning the general election in 
Taiwan as the first elected President, Lee once downplayed his tone in his inaugural 
speech by saying that he wanted to pay visit to the PRC for the betterment of cross 
strait relations, if deemed appropriated by the Taiwanese.
83
 In 1999, Lee, however, 
came back with a stronger political ideology by publishing a biography named 
Taiwan di zhuzhang (With the People Always in My Heart).
84
 The biography 
reiterated his idea of materialising „Taiwan‟s Republic of China‟ as well as his 
abhorrence toward the PRC‟s hegemonic style in boxing Taiwan to the „one country‟ 
corner.
85
 Even the Vice-President, Lien Chan, before getting elected, had clearly 
mentioned that „We hope Beijing will face the fact that China is divided and ruled by 
two equal and autonomous political entities.‟86  
Lee‟s autobiography mirrors Ichiro Ozawa‟s book Blueprint for a New Japan: 
The Rethinking of a Nation, which called for Japan‟s to be a normal nation of 
equipping army and rewriting Article nine of the constitution.
87
 They both wanted to 
change the status quo. However, their ideas inevitably unsettled the stability in East 
Asian international relations. Therefore, in terms of cross strait relations, Lee was 
eventually considered by the PRC as not having a real interest of unification. The 
State Department of the PRC published a White Paper named Yige Zhongguo di 
Yuanze yu Taiwan wenti (The Principal of One China and Taiwan Issues) in February 
2000. It clearly mentioned that the re-unification process should wait no more and 
cannot be postponed indefinitely.
88
  
Although the economic relations, as mentioned before, between the PRC and 
Taiwan did reflect a constant development, especially after the Asian financial crisis, 
however, the political deadlock between the PRC and Taiwan has changed very little 
since the missile crisis. As argued by Taifa Yu, „China will have limited options short 
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of war to persuade Taiwan to start negotiations over national unification. Convinced 
of the dire consequences of democracy, China cannot coax Taiwan into negotiation 
by meeting its demand to democratize.‟89 Nor did the political deadlock relax in the 
early 2000 when Chen Shui-bian replaced Lee as the new President. Steven Goldstein 
contended „What remains unchanged is the overall assessment that, given the full 
range of objectives on all sides, there is little likelihood that the status quo of 
deadlock will move in the direction of stable resolution.‟90  
Although Taiwan issue has always become part of the antagonisms of the 
Sino-American relations, the most tangible outcome was always resorted by selling 
more military weapons to Taiwan in the name of self-defence. Diplomatically, for 
instance, President Bush mentioned very strongly in December 2003 when having a 
meeting with Wen Jiabao, the Chinese premier, in the White House that „We oppose 
any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the 
comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing 
to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.‟91 The 
international discourse, in addition, also questioned the trouble-making style of 
Taiwan and the calling for the cautious U.S.‟s involvement in the cross strait 
relations.
92
 At some point, the question of military confrontation between Taiwan and 
the PRC is no longer of „whether‟ but „how‟-big scale, middle scale or small scale 
war.
93
 Taiwan‟s democratisation is in its „transitional‟ period where a consolidation 
process will need time to be nurtured.
94
 On the contrary, as argued by Andrew Nathan, 
„… the Chinese people must be profoundly transformed before they will be qualified 
for democracy.‟95 Yet, given the PRC‟s re-unification motive and determination, the 
time to generate a mature democratic political system in Taiwan or an initiation of 
democratic government in the PRC seem to be very remote, if not totally 
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unobtainable. After the Legislative Yuen election in December 2004, the Pan-Green 
(independent) force was weaken due to the losing of the seats in the Legislative Yuen, 
meaning that the general public did not feel the same way as Chen‟s government did. 
That mode of social and political demand was further substantiated by the direct 
flight between the PRC and Taiwan during the Chinese New Year in the early 2005. 
The indictment of the misconduct of Ma Ying-Jeou (the most hopeful president-to-be 
from the largest opposition party [Kuomintang KMT]) was finally quashed in the 
summer of 2007. More importantly, The legal fiasco revealed that there was a huge 
learning gap over the understanding of the rules of law and legal impartiality in the 
current political system of Taiwan.
96
  
Before Taiwan‟s Legislative Yuan election on 12 January 2008, I interviewed 
some key members of the DPP in December 2007. One of the members mentioned 
that election was a way to allow voters to express their grievances. „Through a vote‟, 
he added, „years of grievances can be released.‟97 Yet, I suspected the question was 
that sentimental and emotional behaviour could not necessarily be translated into 
long-term economic growth, nor being able to consolidate the democratic values. The 
Legislative Yuan election resulted in a landslide victory of the KMT‟s winning of 81 
seats, while the DPP barely securing 27 seats, out of the 113 seats in total. Such result 
partially reflected the incompetence of the incumbent government to iron out the 
economic downturn of Taiwan during Chen‟s eight years of presidency, not to 
mention the corruption scandals of the family of Chen Shui-bian and other DPP 
members. The outcome of the election also proved that the kind of „sentimental 
brinkmanship‟ did not work. In addition, according to Arthur Ding, „KMT‟s victory 
totally discredited DPP‟s strategy in this regard and will help mend the decade-long 
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divide. The DPP has to amend its policy and move toward moderation to effectively 
conduct the coming presidential campaign.‟98  
 
On 22 March 2008, KMT‟s candidate Ma Ying-jeou won a landslide victory 
of the presidential election of Taiwan, gaining 7.65 millions (58.45 percent) of the 
votes, and his DPP counterpart, Frank Hsieh secured 5.45 millions (41.55 percent). 
On the one hand, although the result spelt a further disapproval of the incumbent 
DPP‟s leadership, there were still a significant amount of diehard DPP supporters 
who were very much pro Taiwanese identity. On the other hand, the election of Ma 
Ying-jeou, other than his popularity among the Taiwanese, quickly galvanised a 
catalyst of changes to the political stalemate in cross strait relations because of his 
„one China‟ idea. 
In his opening speech of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China on 15 October 2007, Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (CPC) came up with a new resolution on cross strait 
relations. He pointed out „Here we would like to make a solemn appeal: On the basis 
of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between 
the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful 
development of cross-Straits relations, and thus usher in a new phase of peaceful 
development.
100
 There are several meanings behind this suggestion. First, the ball is 
now on the Taiwan‟s side and a response is needed from the Taiwanese government. 
Secondly, although there was no mentioning of the use of force to resort reunification 
in his speech, peaceful agreement can be interpreted as an ultimatum, if not accepted. 
Moreover, such policy can be interpreted as a policy to buy time, first for the smooth 
running of the Olympic in 2008 and to gather enough strength if further confrontation 
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does happen. Therefore, Ma‟s election certainly helped relax cross strait tension to an 
extent that further trust perhaps could be re-built. One immediate result was the 
meeting between Vincent Siew, Vice-President elect of Taiwan and Hu Jintao, 
China‟s president, in a Boao Forum in Hainan island on 12 April 2008. 101  The 
meeting echoed some strong cooperative voices over the course of cross strait 
relations. Back to the model, Ma‟s future effort can be interpreted as a testing ground 
to arrest the tide and to ameliorate further escalation of the demands for independence.     
In other words, between integration and independence, there should be lots of 
lessons to be learnt. The democratic development in Taiwan will be scrutinised by the 
PRC‟s government closely in trying to examine the ways in which cross strait 
relations should be developed. These are learning and knowledge diffusion exercise 
between two governments. This is also a long enduring exercise that can be used to 
assess the wisdom of both governments. 
 
Conclusion 
Greater China, like many regions in East Asia, constitutes political, social and 
economic interactions that facilitate a nexus of co-relations. People, who live in the 
vast context of this geographical region, experience the change. Through daily 
interaction, they help write the context of change through business activities, 
investment, migration, trade, culture, and academic exchange. As Sir Ernest Barker 
contended „You must give your own blood to make the spirits of history and theory 
speak.‟102 That is applicable in Greater China. People, the general public and the 
statesmen, experience and continue to help conjuring up the empirical outcomes. I 
have tried to use four Is (integration, interdependence, identity and independence) to 
demonstrate the catalyst of changes.   
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Integration is constructed by the blending of economic resources and social 
activities. The integration process is being formulated through a continuous effort. 
The case of Hong Kong being integrated into the PRC was more or less historically 
determined. Yet, Taiwan‟s economic integration with the PRC is based on social 
interaction, economic calculation and social development. Interdependence indicates 
that there is actually a mutual reliance among the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong in 
terms of interaction. The Asian financial crisis illustrated that financial aspect is a 
good platform to enable some mutual respects of the expert knowledge among one 
another, for instance in the case of many Chinese businesses Initial Public Offerings 
(IPO) launched through Hong Kong‟s financial market. The interaction and 
development with the international organisations also provides some recognition of 
individual‟s identity in East Asia international relations.  
Identity refers to the state of social/political affairs of some general public in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan when confronting with political demands and social and 
economic changes. Their identity was an indication of social and individual‟s 
reactions. Finally, independence appeared to be a political choice under Chen‟s 
presidency, which concerned mostly the decision makers between the PRC and 
Taiwan. If independence has been chosen by Taiwan, the PRC will wage war to re-
unite Taiwan by force. Taiwan‟s Legislative Yuan election on 12 January 2008 and 
the presidential election on 22 March 2008 gradually shifted the course of political 
development away from independence because both are under KMT‟s control. These 
four perspectives are not exclusive. There should be many unnoticed relations to be 
further developed within Greater China. What I hope to do is to outline the most 
plausible approaches that may help shed light on the study of Greater China from 
their theoretical as well as practical notions of development.  
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